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1 Introduction
As time goes by non-European countries increasingly adopt com-
prehensive data protection legislation in the EU-style. Up until 
the beginning of the year 2012, the world had 89 countries with 
data privacy laws.1 Outside the EU (27 countries) and EEA (3 
countries), where the European Directive 95/46/EC is binding, 
there were a total of 59 countries with data protection laws in Eu-
rope, Asia, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, the Caribbean, 
North America and Australasia.2 Africa has 11 countries out of 
54 with such legislation while about eight others have either pre-
pared draft or concrete bills. The latter are still pending before 
their executive or legislative bodies. Commentators in the field 
of data privacy are in agreement that the adoption of data pro-
tection legislation outside of Europe is largely a result of the in-
fluence of the European regime of data protection. Such regime 
is mainly comprised under the EU Directive 95/46/EC. They as-
sert that the Directive is the most influential instrument of all in-
ternational codes of data protection policies in the world.3 This 
influence, unlike the rest of the international codes such as the 
1  Greenleaf, G., ‘Global data privacy laws: 89 countries, and accelerating’, 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 98/2012.
2  Ibid, p.5. Note that the number of countries with data protection laws out-
side Europe has kept increasing since 2012 with for example Ghana adopting da-
ta privacy legislation in February 2012.
3  See e.g., Kuner, C., ‘Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Pro-
tection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, and Future’, TILT Law & Technology Work-
ing Paper No. 016/2010 October 2010, Version: 1.0, p.6, Social Science Research 
Network Electronic Paper Collection, at p. 9.
OECD Guidelines 1980, Council of Europe Convention 1981 and 
UN Guidelines 1990, originates mainly from the Directive’s spill-
over effect. To be sure, Article 25 of the Directive clearly restricts 
transfer of personal data from EU/EEA to third countries if such 
countries do not provide an ‘adequate’ level of protection of per-
sonal data. What this means is that third countries which are non-
EU/EEA countries have to enact data protection legislation that 
must be considered by Europe as adequate if they wish to receive 
personal information from residents in EU/EEA. Because of Ar-
ticle 25 of the Directive, Europe has been criticised for legislating 
for the whole world. Indeed, the European Union itself through 
the Article 29 Working Party has expressed fears with regard to 
an assessment of the ‘adequacy’ of data protection in third coun-
tries as this may amount to an act of political provocation of sov-
ereign states risking to spoil diplomatic relations. In their view 
‘some third countries might come to see the absence of a find-
ing that they provided adequate protection as politically provoc-
ative or at least discriminatory, in that the absence of a finding is 
as likely to be the result of their case not having been examined as 
of a judgment on their data protection system.’4 Amplifying this 
fear Seth Hobby posits that ‘no country likes to feel the downward 
pressure of being dictated to concerning issues that may have sig-
nificance in terms of a nation’s ability to regulate its own affairs, 
ergo national sovereignty, simply because of economic leverage.’5 
Yet in an attempt to minimise or remove these fears, Europe has 
cautiously left it to third countries to initiate the process of ‘ade-
quacy’ assessment. Indeed, the fact that it would be difficult for all 
third countries to meet the ‘adequacy’ standard prompted Europe 
to incorporate Article 26 in its regime to permit continued trans-
fer of personal data from the EU/EEA to third countries that fail 
to meet the ‘adequacy’ test of the European law. In the latter case, 
some minimum criteria less stringent than the requirement of 
Article 25 must first be fulfilled. This allowance strategically helps 
4  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on Transfer 
of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data 
Protection Directive’, DG XV D/5025/98/WP 12, (adopted on 24th July 1998), p. 27.
5  Hobby, S.P., ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: Implementing a Worldwide 
Data Protection Regime and How the U.S Position has progressed’, International 
Law & Management Review, 2005, Vol. 1, pp.155-190, at p.159.
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Just before the Directive 95/46/EC on the regulation of processing of personal 
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Europe to transfer personal data to its trading partners at least at 
a limited level. Undoubtedly Africa, with its eleven countries so 
far with comprehensive data protection legislation, largely relies 
on Article 26 of the Directive to trade with Europe. 
It is worth noting that the ‘adequacy’ standard in Article 25 of 
the Directive has drawn European and its counterpart American 
scholars into a fierce debate as to whether it is proper for Europe 
to adopt a data protection regime with sweeping effect. This de-
bate had and still has impact in the development of data protec-
tion policies on the two sides of the Atlantic and beyond such re-
gions. This article is set to investigate the place of Africa in the 
trans-Atlantic debate and assess its overall implication to the da-
ta protection reforms in the continent.
2 The trans-Atlantic debate
The trans-Atlantic debate over the protection of personal da-
ta traces its origin from the adoption of the European Directive 
95/46/EC in 1995. Such debate is premised on modes of regulat-
ing privacy. Traditionally, Europe has regulated privacy by com-
prehensive legislation for a long time. The main features of such a 
regulatory regime are the incorporation of the basic principles of 
data protection as well as supervisory authorities. These authori-
ties have the primary obligation to enforce the basic principles of 
data protection and incidental matters. In contrast, the US have 
only invoked an ad hoc sectoral approach. Under this regulatory 
approach, the market has been left to regulate the private sector 
with a multitude of privacy legislation while a sort of ‘comprehen-
sive’ legislation covers the public sector only. Unlike in Europe, 
the United States’ legislative approach lacks a set of basic data pro-
tection principles as well as a centralised supervisory authority.
The bottom-line of the differences between EU and US regula-
tory approaches to protection of privacy are two opposing philos-
ophies. For Europe, the comprehensive approach is largely in-
formed by human rights sentiments that were a result of the trau-
mas of the World Wars. Indeed, the rise of the norm of ‘dignity’ 
which is at the core of privacy in Europe is a product of a reaction 
against fascism and especially against Nazism.6 In this way privacy 
is protected as a fundamental human right in Europe. To be sure, 
Article 8 and 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 and International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 respectively provide the norma-
tive basis of data protection in Europe. These two provisions and 
case law developed around them have been the subject of wide ac-
ademic discussion.7 In contrast, the American philosophy of pri-
vacy is built upon the norm of ‘liberty’ of individuals in relation to 
the state.8 Hence, in 1890 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis pub-
6  Beignier, B., Le Droit de la Personnalité 60-61 (1992) cited in Whitman, J.Q, 
‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty’, The Yale Law Jour-
nal, 2004, Vol.113, pp.1151-1221 at 1166.
7  See e.g. Bygrave, L.A., ‘Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in 
Human Rights Treaties’, International Journal of Law and Information Technolo-
gy, 1998, Vol.6, No.3, pp.247-284; Ulyashyna, L., ‘Does case law developed by the 
European Court of human Rights pursuant to ECHR Article 8 add anything sub-
stantial to the rules and principles found in ordinary data protection principle?’, A 
Tutorial Paper presented at the Norwegian Centre for Computers and Law (NRC-
CL), Spring, 2006; De Hert, P and Gutwirth, S., ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of 
Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalism in Action’, in Gutwirth, S et al (eds)., 
Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, 2009, pp.3-44.
8  Buchner, B., Informationelle Selbstbestimmung im Privatrecht, 2006, pp. 
19-20. 
lished their seminal article ‘The Right to Privacy’9 in which they re-
flect on the American views to privacy as the ‘right to be let alone’. 
Despite the regulatory difference between Europe and Ameri-
ca, there had never been any stronger debate across the Atlantic in 
the period preceding the Directive 95/46/EC. This is partly because 
first, the codes of data protection existing prior to the Directive 
were only soft law (e.g. OECD Guidelines 1980, Council of Europe 
Convention 1981 and UN Guidelines 1990) and as such not bind-
ing. Secondly, none of these codes provided a restrictive regime of 
the international transfer of personal data as it is the case with the 
Directive 95/46/EC which unlike the previous codes is binding. As 
pointed out, it was formally in 1995 that the trans-Atlantic debate 
emerged. On behalf of the US, Seth Hobby argues that ‘although 
the primary goal of the Directive was to inculcate unity of data 
protection regulation among the states of Union (then number-
ing fifteen), certain provisions (particularly Article 25) contained 
within the Directive dealing with data transfers to countries out-
side of the EU have an absolute impact on the data protection pol-
icies of every nation that trades with an EU member.’10 He further 
argues that ‘given that at the inception of the Directive no single 
nation in the world had a data protection framework even remote-
ly close to that required by EU’s mandate, such a requirement au-
tomatically injected the international community with a dose of 
insecurity over its future trade potential with the EU.’11 Seth con-
cludes that ‘when considered in a broad global context, it is hard 
to avoid the feeling that the EU’s implementation of such a wide 
sweeping regulatory exercise in the realm of fundamental human 
rights goes far by effectively creating a world-wide data privacy uti-
lizing the proverbial back door.’12 Seth’s stance has frequently re-
curred in America’s scholarship in various ways. Because of this, 
the present article avoids repetitions of each and every formula-
tion of America’s side of arguments.
At the same time, some of the US discussion against the long 
arm of Directive 95/46/EC has focused on the legality of the pro-
visions under international trade law, most notably the 1994 Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which restricts sig-
natory states from limiting transborder data flow in ways that 
involve arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against other 
states.13 Nevertheless, such prohibition is not absolute. By way of 
exception to the general rule, GATS allows under Article XIV(c)
(ii) minimum restriction on transborder data flow in order to se-
cure ‘protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the 
processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection 
of confidentiality of individual records and accounts.’ Bygrave ar-
gues that while such restrictions must also conform to the Agree-
ment’s basic prohibition against arbitrary or unjustified discrim-
ination between countries and against disguised restrictions on 
trade in services, little if any solid evidence indicates that Arti-
cle 25 and 26 of the Directive have been or are being applied in 
breach of that prohibition.14 
9  Warren, S.D and Brandeis, L.S., ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, 
1890, Vol. 4, No.5, pp.193-195; for German translation see Datenschutz und Daten-
sicherheit (DuD), 2012, Vol. 36, pp. 755-766.
10  Hobby, p.156, note 5, supra.
11  Ibid, p.157.
12  Ibid.
13  Bygrave, L.A., ‘International Agreements to Protect Personal Data‘ in G.
Greenleaf and J.B. Rule (eds)., Global Privacy Protection: The First Generation, Ed-
ward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham,UK/Northampton, MA,USA, 2008, 
pp.15-49, at p. 40.
14  Ibid, p.41.
448 DuD • Datenschutz und Datensicherheit      7 | 2013
SCHWERPUNKT
Similarly, allegations have been raised to the effect that by 
adopting Directive 95/46/EC, Europe intended to protect its busi-
ness interests against the whole world. There are no absolute rejec-
tions of these allegations and Bygrave argues convincingly that it 
is scarcely to be overlooked that implementation of the Directive – 
particularly of Arts 25 and 26 – might well have protectionist ben-
efits for data controllers established within the EU.15 This position 
is in line with the view taken by Justice Michael Kirby, Chairman 
of the expert group responsible for drafting the OECD Guidelines 
which are similar to Directive 95/46/EC, that such a policy was 
adopted for purposes of economic protectionism.16
For Europeans, it has widely been viewed that the United States 
of America’s approach to protection of privacy is a weak stan-
dard. Moreover, Europe has defended its comprehensive regime 
of data privacy and in particular Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Di-
rective 95/46/EC as a means to ensure that personal data of its 
citizens and residents are not relocated to off-shore destinations 
without adequate protection of personal data rendering the Di-
rective impotent. 
Appreciating the differences in regulatory approaches to da-
ta protection and in attempting to reconcile the tension over the 
trans-Atlantic debate, the EU and the US forged the Safe Harbor 
(SH) arrangement. The latter was adopted in the year 2000. Essen-
tially the SH comprises privacy principles in a modified and sim-
plified version that are applied by companies on both sides of the 
Atlantic when transferring personal data. Although the EU Com-
mission had decided that the SH meets the adequacy test of Eu-
ropean law, SH is an arrangement that Europe is not comfortable 
with. It is arguable that the European Commission’s adequacy de-
cision on SH was passed for the convenience of a continued flow 
of personal data on both sides of the Atlantic with the view of sus-
taining trade, but falls considerably below the Directive’s standards. 
The strong criticism of this low standard by other European bodies 
(e.g. Article 29 Working Party) means that it is no exaggeration to 
say that the Commission had sold out Europe’s high privacy stan-
dards set by the Directive in order to protect its US trade.17 It has 
been argued that the SH decision could signal that the EU Commis-
sion will decide that weak privacy protection in other countries is 
also ‘adequate’ to avoid accusations of inconsistency and hypocri-
sy.18 Yet this may not necessarily be the case taking into account the 
fact that the SH was negotiated between two powers with relatively 
equal economic strength and different, but long-established tradi-
tions of protection of privacy. It is difficult to imagine that Europe 
will be prepared to negotiate another SH with other countries, es-
pecially developing countries whose economies are weak. 
With the adoption of the SH the initial tension between the USA 
and EU in the wake of the Directive’s adoption cooled consider-
ably.19 However, the EU’s proposed new data protection regulation 
announced on 25 January 2012 has provoked afresh the trans-At-
lantic debate. This can be demonstrated, for example, by the con-
ference organised by the European Commission in Washington 
in the spring of 2012 which saw tit-for-tat exchanges between EU 
15  Bygrave, L.A., Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and 
Limits, Kluwer Law International, the Hague/London/New York, 2002, p.115.
16  Kirby, M.D., ‘Legal Aspects of transborder data flows‘, International Com-
puter Law Adviser, 1991, Vol.5, No.4, pp.4-11, at pp.5-6.
17  Greenleaf, G., ‘Safe Harbor’s Low Benchmark for “adequacy”: EU sells out 
Privacy for US$’, PLPR 32, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2000/32.
html accessed 31 March 2013.
18  Ibid.
19  Bygrave, note 12, supra.
and US government representatives as to which of them have the 
better system.20 It is worth noting that the US’ efforts to regulate 
privacy culminating in the adoption of the Commercial Privacy 
Bill of Rights 2011(later renamed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
2012) have been severely criticised. For example, in her speech to-
wards the end of the year 2011, Viviane Reding (the Vice-President 
of the European Commission, EU Justice Commissioner) open-
ly criticized the U.S Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights as the U.S 
‘self-regulation’ may not be sufficient to achieve full interoperabil-
ity between the EU and U.S.21 This comment clearly indicates that 
the trans-Atlantic debate will not end any time soon.
3 Beyond the trans-Atlantic 
debate: Africa’s perspective 
The dominant view in privacy literature is that Africans do not 
have or value privacy. The single reason advanced by scholars is 
that the over-dominance of collectivist cultures in African societ-
ies outweighs the self-autonomy of individuals and hence denies 
them space to claim for privacy.22 However, a departure from the 
dominant school of thought is noticeable in the stance taken by 
Professor Nwauche who asks, ‘is privacy important in Nigeria?’ 
He answers this question affirmatively, advancing the reason that 
there are human beings in Nigeria and more so a constitution-
al protection of this right. Yet, he notes that this is one right that 
has not received adequate protection or elaboration both in the 
definition, philosophical basis or the key issues of the concept of 
privacy.23 Accordingly, Nwauche associates the existence of pri-
vacy values in Nigeria and probably across Africa with the dig-
nitary concept which seeks to protect the personality of an indi-
vidual because he is a human being.24 
Likewise some African scholars have struggled to conceptualise 
privacy in the African cultural context in vain. For instance, Bakib-
inga has made a fruitless call that ‘privacy has to be defined in a way 
that is acceptable to the Ugandan society given the emphasis on 
communalism versus individual rights.’25 To achieve that, Bakib-
inga recommends that one way to start seeking for such definition 
would be to commission studies to obtain perceptions of privacy 
within the Ugandan society.26 Interestingly, the only attempt made 
so far to define privacy in Africa, though still patterned to the West-
ern culture, is that of Professor Neethling. His theory states that 
‘privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by exclu-
20  Kuner, C et al., ‘The end of the beginning’ International Data Privacy Law, 
2012, Vol.2, No.3, pp.115-116, at p.116.
21  Reding, V., ‘The Future of Data Protection and Transatlantic Cooperation’, 
Speech at the 2nd Annual European Data Protection and Privacy Conference 
(SPEECH/11/851), Brussels, 6 December 2011, pp. 1-4, at p.4; see also, Greenleaf, G 
and Waters, N., ‘Obama’s Privacy Framework: An offer to be left on the table?’ Pri-
vacy Laws & Business International Report, 2012, No.119, pp.6-9.
22  See e.g., Gutwirth, S., Privacy and the Information Age, Lanham/Boulder/
New York/Oxford/ Rowman & Littlefield Publ., 2002, p.24; Bygrave, L. A., ‘Privacy 
Protection in a Global Context – A Comparative Overview’, Scandinavian Studies 
in Law, 2004, Vol. 47, pp. 319–348, at p.328; Bygrave, L.A., ‘Privacy and Data Pro-
tection in an International Perspective’, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2010, Vol. 
56, pp.165-200, at p.176.
23  Nwauche, E.S., ‘The Right to Privacy in Nigeria’, Review of Nigerian Law 
and Practice, 2007, Vol.1, No.1, pp.62-90, at p. 66.
24  Ibid, p.65.
25  Bakibinga, E. M., ‘Managing Electronic Privacy in the Telecommunications 
Sub-Sector: The Ugandan Perspective’, 2004, http//:thepublicvoic.org/eventsca-
petown04/bakibinga.doc, pp.1-13, at p.12.
26  Ibid, p.13.
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sion from publicity. This condition includes all those personal facts 
which the person himself at the relevant time determines to be ex-
cluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he 
evidences a will for privacy.’27 That far, it can safely be argued that 
privacy in Africa is principally an imported Western liberal con-
cept. Bakibinga convincingly posits, that although in Africa the 
community comes first, privacy will still be an important concern 
as the information technology revolution advances.28 On the other 
hand, it may be argued that at present many Africans largely suffer 
from ‘privacy myopia’ i.e. the tendency to undervalue the bits of in-
formation about themselves so that it does not seem worth it to go 
to the trouble of protecting such information.29 
Not surprisingly therefore, privacy reforms in Africa contin-
ue to take shape at a snail’s pace. This is despite the restrictions 
of the transfer of personal data to third countries put under Arti-
cle 25 of the EU Directive 95/46/EC. It is imperative to point out 
that the pressure generated so far on the United States by the Eu-
ropean data privacy regime has at present not yet arisen in a di-
rect and serious manner in view of the fact that African countries 
just like many other developing countries are not major trading 
partners of the EU Member States.30 Yet, those few African ju-
risdictions which have so far adopted data protection legislation 
have largely done so for economic motivations though. The rest 
of African countries without data protection legislation rely upon 
the exceptions permitted under Article 26 of the Directive to ex-
change personal information with the EU. This explains why, for 
example, South Africa was able to accommodate the 2010 World 
Cup at the time when massive personal information of EU citi-
zens was being transferred to South Africa despite the fact that 
she had no data protection legislation.
Although the current sub-regional privacy codes in Africa such 
as ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data 
Protection for the Economic Community of West African States, 
the SADC Data Protection Model Law 2012 for Southern African 
Development Community and the proposed draft African Union 
convention on establishment of a credible legal framework for cy-
ber security in Africa 2011 are likely to influence the development 
of data protection law in Africa,31 doubts have been cast on their 
ability to do so. The proposed Nigerian data protection bill is a 
case at point. This bill is a far weaker standard than the ECOWAS 
Supplementary Act which is binding code in Nigeria, an ECOW-
AS member.32 There is also little evidence that suggests that the 
adoption of data protection legislation in the eleven African coun-
tries was/is in compliance with sub-regional data privacy codes 
in Africa. This is because, first, most of the national data protec-
tion legislation in Africa pre-dates such codes. Second, even af-
ter the adoption of these sub-regional codes little or no adjust-
ments have been made in the national data privacy legislation in 
line with them. It is also interesting to note that national laws on 
27  Neethling, J., ‘The Concept of Privacy in South African Law’, The South Af-
rican Law Journal, 2005, Vol.122, No.1, pp.18-28, at p.19.
28  EPIC Alert, ‘EPIC Hosts Privacy and Public Voice Conference in Africa’, 23 
December 2005, Vol. 11, No. 24,      http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_11.24.
html accessed 31 March 2013.
29  See e.g., Bakibinga, p.5, note 24, supra.
30  Carauna, M.M and Cannataci, J.A., ‘European Union Privacy and Data Pro-
tection Principles: Compatibility with Culture and Legal Frameworks in Islamic 
States’, Information & Communications Technology Law, 2007, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
pp.99-124, at p.110.
31  See e.g., Greenleaf, p.8. note 1, supra.
32  Makulilo, A.B., ‘Nigeria’s Data Protection Bill: Too many surprises,’ Privacy 
Laws & Business International Report, 2012, No.120, pp.25-27.
data protection in Africa which post-date the sub-regional data 
protection codes make little or no reference to such sub-regional 
codes. This is the case for example with South Africa, where the 
preparatory works to the proposed Protection of Personal Infor-
mation Bill 2009 show no reference to the SADC Data Protection 
Model Law (to which South Africa is a SADC member state). In-
terestingly, the reference point to the South African proposed law 
has been at all the times the EU Directive 95/46/EC and even the 
draft EU proposed Data Protection Regulation announced on 25 
January 2012 which is not yet adopted. 
At the same time it is worthwhile to point out that the African 
sub-regional, regional as well as national data protection legisla-
tion are all modelled upon the European Directive 95/46/EC. This 
is because it is the desire of African countries to meet the ‘adequa-
cy’ standard of the European law so as to attract foreign invest-
ments. Yet, the recent assessments by EU led consultants of the 
four African jurisdictions namely, Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Tu-
nisia and Morocco reveals that they are still far away from the EU 
‘adequacy’ standard.33 Nevertheless, the EU Directive remains the 
most preferred model of privacy regulation in Africa. Perhaps the 
question is whether Africa adapts the EU model of privacy reg-
ulation through conscious choices or forceful imposition by Eu-
rope? In other words, has the trans-Atlantic debate or anything of 
the nature of such debate emerged in the course of the data pro-
tection law reforms in Africa?
Up until recently, there has been a lack of serious academic de-
bate among African scholars critical of the European extra-ter-
ritorial reach of the EU Directive 95/46/EC. There are also no 
prospects for this debate to arise as more African countries en-
act data privacy legislation in the EU-style. Concomitantly Afri-
can commentators have taken a positive view of the EU model of 
data protection. There is little feeling that EU is imposing its da-
ta protection regime as is the case with the trans-Atlantic debate 
where American scholars are bitter about the EU data protection 
regime. So far, the majority of scholars in Africa positively rec-
ommend the adoption of data protection legislation based on the 
EU model. For instance, Neethling asserts that with the exception 
of Van der Merwe, South African commentators are unanimous 
that the creation of such measures (data protection) through legis-
lation is a matter of great urgency.34 Similarly, calls by other com-
mentators in Africa for adoption of data protection legislation in 
the EU style include Ubena;35 Kusamotu;36 Izougu;37 Nwanko;38 
33  For detailed analysis of these assessments, see e.g., Makulilo, A.B., ‘Data 
Protection Regimes in Africa: too far from European ‘adequacy’ standard?,’ Jour-
nal of International Data Privacy Law, 2012, Vol.3, No.1, pp.42-50.
34  Neethling, J et al., Neethling’s Law of Personality, 2nd Edition, LexisNexis, 
Durban, 2005, p.271. 
35  Ubena, J., ‘Tanzania lag on privacy law’, Tanzania Legal News, posted on 
8th June 2010, http://tanlex.wordpress.com/ accessed 02 April 2013; see also, 
Ubena, J., ‘Privacy: A Forgotten Right in Tanzania‘, the Tanzania Lawyer, 2012, 
Vol.1, No.2, pp. 72-114.
36  Kusamotu, A., ‘Privacy Law and Technology in Nigeria: The Legal Frame-
work will not meet the Test of Adequacy as Mandated by Article 25 of European 
Union Directive 95/46’, Information & Communications Technology Law, 2007, 
Vol.16, No. 2, pp. 149-159.
37  Izuogu, C.E., ‘Data Protection and Other Implications in the Ongoing SIM 
Card Registration Process’, 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1597665, accessed 02 April 2013; see also Izuogu, C.E., ‘Nigeria: Data Protection 
& Privacy Issues in NCC’s Directive on SIM Card Registration’, 2010, http://www.
facebook.com/note.php?note_id=388277770826 accessed 02 April 2013.
38  Nwanko, I.S., ‘Part I: Nigeria’s SIM Card Registration Regulations 2010: The 
Implications of unguarded Personal Data Collection’, http://www.facebook.com/
note.php?note_id=10150095718055827 accessed 02 April 2013; see also Nwanko, 
I.S., ‘Part II: Nigeria’s SIM Card Registration Regulations 2010: The Implications of 
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Akinsuyi;39 Enyew;40 and Bakibinga.41 At the same time, commen-
tators who have not recommended the adoption of data protec-
tion legislation based on EU model have done so not because they 
feel that the EU regime is imposed on their respective countries 
or Africa but rather because they believe that common law is suf-
ficient to protect privacy in their respective countries.42 
The acceptability of the EU data protection model in Africa was/
is further accentuated by other factors. First and foremost is that 
while on its face privacy appears to be incompatible with African 
cultural values (i.e. ubuntu), such culture has less strong expres-
sion and philosophy in the privacy arena. As a result, ubuntu can-
not guide or influence legislation significantly more than for ex-
ample the EU Data protection principles.43 However, this can be 
contrasted with other aspects of African culture which are not 
only incompatible to Western culture, but also significantly capa-
ble of influencing legislation. The case at point is, for instance, the 
contentious issue surrounding homosexuality in the African cul-
ture. While in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa homosexuality 
is generally illegal reflecting African culture, recent wrath by Af-
rican governments against Western attempts to compel such gov-
ernments to legitimise homosexuality amid threats of cutting aids 
has seen the adoption or proposals for adoption of anti-homosexu-
ality laws. The famous ‘Kill the Gays Bill’ in Uganda is illustrative. 
At the same time, the major legal systems in Africa namely 
common and civil law legal systems which are Western in ori-
gin, create fertile grounds for adaptability of European law. While 
these systems were forcibly imposed on Africa by European coun-
tries during colonial rule as part of the colonial superstructure 
and an instrument of coercing Africans to participate in the co-
lonial economy, they were inherited by African countries on in-
dependence. For example, in many common law jurisdictions, 
common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general appli-
cation in the United Kingdom are still the sources of municipal 
law.44 Thus, the attitude to view these systems as colonial has di-
minished significantly as more customisation continues to take 
place. It is arguable that African countries are no strangers to the 
adaptation of ‘foreign law’. 
The role of international law is also significant. Oppong, while 
citing other commentators, underscores that ‘Africa is becoming 
more “international law-friendly”’.45 He goes on to posit that ‘the 
initial hostility or ambivalence of the post-colonial towards in-
ternational law is giving way to increased participation in inter-
national law processes, both in terms of institutional participa-
tion and in the development of norms.’46 This can be demonstrat-
unguarded Personal Data Collection’, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_
id=10150095718055827 accessed 02 April 2013.
39  Akinsuyi, F.F., ‘Data Protection Legislation for Nigeria, The Time is Now!’, 
Nigerian Muse, http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20071004075550zg/sections/
general-articles/data-protection-legislation-for-nigeria-the-time-is-now/  
accessed 02 April 2013.
40  Enyew, A.B., ‘Regulatory Legal Regime on the Protection of Privacy and 
Personal Information in Ethiopia’, LL.M Thesis, University of Oslo, Norway, 2009.
41  Bakibinga, note 25, pp.12-13, supra.
42  Nwauche, note 23, p.83, supra.
43  Olinger, H.N, et al., ‘Western privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some Critical Com-
ments on the influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in South Africa’, the 
International Information & Library Review, 2007, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 31-43, p.40.
44  See e.g., Tanzanian Judicature and Application of Laws Act, Cap.358 R.E 
2002, s. 2(3).
45  Oppong, R.F., ‘Re-imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent 
Trends in the Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Afri-
ca’, Fordham International Law Journal, 2006, Vol.30, No.2, pp.296-345, at p. 296.
46  Ibid.
ed by the frequent trend in Africa towards making international 
law supreme over and directly or automatically applicable within 
the domestic legal systems.47 Concomitantly, the concept of sov-
ereignty, which suggests that national legal systems are sealed or 
isolated from outside interference, is being re-assessed.48 
Similarly, there is the role of judiciary in Africa in interpreting 
new areas of law influenced by modern technologies. In Trust Bank 
Tanzania Ltd v. Le-Marsh Enterprises Ltd and Others,49 for example, 
the High Court of Tanzania while interpreting whether a computer 
printout is a banker’s book, made the following observations ‘...Tan-
zania is not an island by itself. The country must move fast to inte-
grate itself with the global banking community in terms of techno-
logical changes and the manner in which banking business is being 
conducted. The courts have to take due cognizance of the techno-
logical revolution that has engulfed the world. Generally speaking 
as of now, record keeping in our banks is to a large extent “old fash-
ioned” but changes are taking place. The law can ill afford to shut its 
eyes to what is happening around the world in the banking frater-
nity.’ These remarks justified the court to use the UK Banking Act 
1979 to fill the gap in the Tanzanian Evidence Act, Cap 6 R.E 2002 
and held that a computer printout amounted to a banker’s book. It 
is worth noting that in an earlier case of Tanzania Cotton Market-
ing Board v. Cogecot Cotton Company SA,50 the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania (the Supreme Court), held that the words ‘registered post’ 
appearing in Rule 4 of the Arbitration Rules, 1957 should be inter-
preted widely enough in order to take into account the current de-
velopment in communication technology that has taken place since 
1957 when the rules were enacted. The approach taken by Tanzani-
an courts with regard to legal interpretation in the context of mod-
ern technologies is similar to that of other sub-Saharan countries. It 
is arguable that since privacy risks are accelerated by modern tech-
nologies, courts in Africa will be likely to incline towards applying 
foreign law in deciding privacy disputes. 
4 Final remarks 
If anything, data protection reforms in Africa have been largely in-
fluenced by the Directive 95/46/EC. In all eleven countries which 
have so far adopted omnibus data protection laws, the legislative 
processes indicate that the broad agenda of these legal reforms is to 
sustain business process outsourcing from Europe. Indeed Article 
25 of the Directive is frequently cited as the justification for adopt-
ing data protection laws in Africa. Be as it may, the data protection 
law reforms in Africa have not been accompanied by a rejectionist 
debate such as the trans-Atlantic policy debate. In contrast, African 
scholars have scarcely raised any alarm as to the Directive’s regula-
tory overreaching. Rather they have been positive about the EU da-
ta protection model and have even encouraged their governments 
to adopt comprehensive data protection legislation. It is submitted 
that in Africa the trans-Atlantic policy debate is more of academ-
ic relevance than a practical one with real implications for Africa’s 
data protection law reforms. The EU Directive is widely viewed as 
the source of inspiration, comparative law, and model in African 
legislative reforms. 
47  Ibid, p.297.
48  Ibid, p.326.
49  [2002]T.L.R 145, at pp.148-149.
50  [1997]T.L.R 165, at p.170.
DuD • Datenschutz und Datensicherheit      7 | 2013 451
SCHWERPUNKT
